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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to explain why a low and declining saving 
rate should be a problem in a world of free capital flows and increas-
ing wealth. In Italy consumer households’ saving have been the main 
driver of economic stability and growth, funding investments and 
public debt, and despite international turbulences Italy was acknowl-
edged as a high saving country until the early 1990’s. Ever since, 
however, households saving rate plunged, in spite of an increasing 
financial wealth, and our aim is to explain why: we suggest two main 
causes. The first is related to the economic policies implemented to 
deal with four major economic events, prompted by economic misa-
lignments: a) the 1992’s currency crisis, b) the run-up to the Euro, c) 
the 2006’ turning point, preceding the 2008’s crisis, and d) the 
2009’s public debt crisis and the following policy of fiscal consolida-
tion. These four events were dealt with economic policies which 
overlooked the huge income and saving shifts from households to 
government and private sectors: rising tax burden, especially indirect 
taxes, freezing of nominal public expenditures and falling real wages 
were the main policy instruments, while a decreasing households’ 
income and saving was a primary consequences. Households have 
been struggling to smooth their standard of life drawing on their sav-
ing and wealth, but the effort became all the more difficult as the 
saving rate was falling below a critical level, increasing the probabil-
ity of negative saving and debt. Gross national saving turned less 
than aggregate investment, prompting an increasing borrowing from 
abroad and a corresponding negative current account. The second 
cause is structural and covers two crucial issues: the first is the deep 
economy impacts of a changing age structure, as a consequence of a 
sudden fertility drop. The second issue is related to the falling house-
holds size composition jointly with the rising share of quasi-fixed 
costs necessary for a decent life. We show how and why a well de-
signed Welfare State could help to restore income stability and sav-
ing, tackling the widespread problem of changing age structure in 
most countries.  
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Introduction1 
 
Until the early 1990’s Italian households were acknowledged for 
their high propensity to save, 23,7% of disposable income in 1991: 
afterward the rate of saving started to decline, falling down rapidly to 
8,9% in 2011. Precautionary saving absorbed shocks and stabilized 
demand: after passing a critical country-specific threshold, around 
10% of disposable income in Italy, income slumps in 2009 and 2012 
were transmitted directly to the consumption level, while the low 
saving rate made public debt financing more vulnerable to capital 
markets volatility. We aim to highlight causes and consequences of 
this decline, asking to what extent it can be an early warning of what 
lies ahead for other mature European countries. 
 
1. The economics of low and declining saving rate 
 
The decline in national saving, particularly households’ saving, has 
been the subject of careful examination for many countries, especial-
ly the US (Bosworth, 2012): the basic question is why a low and de-
clining saving rate should be a problem in a world of free capital 
flows and increasing wealth. Saving and wealth are directly related, 
because saving is the main source of wealth accumulation: however 
the flow of saving, or bank deposit, is liquid, with low or even nega-
tive real interest rate, while wealth, especially financial wealth, can 
provide yields - through rents, bond interests and stock dividends - 
and also capital gains or losses. Wealth, even more financial wealth, 
is risky, in a way that saving, in the form of cash and  bank deposit, 
are not: Federal Deposit Insurance, created in 1933 in the US with 
the Banking Act, provides insurance up to $250.000 for each deposit 
ownership in each bank, while in Italy a similar insurance is provided 
up to € 100.000. 
                                                     
1 I thank Francesca Tartamella for her patience in following the trail of my intricate 
thoughts, giving me help and opinions without which I could not complete this pa-
per. Carlo Bellavite, colleague and friend, gave me a careful comment to a prelimi-
nary draft and the final version absorbed all his suggestions. Of course the final re-
sponsibility is, as usual, only mine.  
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Both wealth and saving are highly concentrated: in Italy, in 2010, 
the top 10% of households, ranked by income, owned the 44% of 
households saving and the top 10% of households, ranked by wealth, 
owned the 46% of total wealth, real and financial. Saving and wealth 
are related but not close substitute: in 2007, before the onset of the 
Great Recession, in the US the households’ saving rate was close to 
zero while the ratio of financial wealth to disposable income was 
very high (4,95 in the US and 3,41 in Italy), but this did not prevent 
the outbreak of the most severe recession since the Great Depression.  
The Great Recession shed light on some major reasons: a low 
saving rate, coupled with a credit crunch, exacerbates the house-
holds’ and firms’ financial crisis and worsens their income and profit 
expectations; pushes the trade and current account balance into defi-
cit; increases financial instability because of an excessive reliance on 
volatile foreign lending, especially with a high public debt; can de-
creases suddenly consumption, while households deleverage and in-
crease saving to pay debt, putting downward pressure on demand and 
employment; increases households’ economic hardship, especially 
for those with negative saving, i. e. income less than current con-
sumption (excluding durables). Past or present savings are the main 
source of wealth accumulation, especially financial wealth, and this 
is the crucial reason for understanding why in Italy the households’ 
saving rate slumped over the last two decades.  
Until the early 1990’s households’ saving rate in Italy was among 
the highest with respect to comparable countries, well beyond what 
could be explained by a life cycle model: indeed a careful analysis 
suggested that “capital markets imperfections are one of the likely 
explanations for the high Italian saving rate. Further, their interaction 
with growth can account for its recent decline” (Guiso, Jappelli and 
Terlizzese, 1994). A recent paper pointed to the wealth effect as 
another possible driving force behind the increasing propensity to 
consume  and the symmetric saving rate decline: Bassanetti and Zol-
lino (2006) use a VECM estimation on quarterly national account da-
ta (1980-2006) to confirm the existence of a significant wealth effect, 
controlling for the 1992 crisis and the 1998 run-up to the EMU. It is 
obviously crucial to assess whether these two periods implied per-
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manent or transitory effects: our analysis will provide a more de-
tailed analysis supporting the view of a long-run effect. Households’ 
saving rate and financial wealth to disposable income relation is 
mildly inverse, which means that, at least until the Great Recession 
onset, a falling saving rate has been balanced by an increasing finan-
cial wealth (figure 1): the crucial question is whether    this pattern 
can be generalized to the whole economy, because empirical evi-
dences do not confirm this assumption. Highly indebted households 
show a steep increase of the debt to disposable income ratio, over 
time and across income levels (Ehrmann, 2006) while the Bank of 
Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) shows a very 
high concentration of the saving pool in the highest income deciles. 
This pattern makes difficult to interpret the saving rate dynamic and 
the wealth dynamic without acknowledging the wide heterogeneity 
between “rich”, “middle class” and “poor” households: wealth effect 
surely mirrors economic behavior for the top 10% but it is hardly re-
levant for the bottom 10%, where indebted households are the great 
majority. Inequality of saving and wealth is therefore a central issue 
when addressing the goal of the economic recovery. Relying on rep-
resentative agent models hides the distributional impact of fiscal 
(consolidation) policies which entail serious equity problems: the 
trade-off can be addressed only by a fiscal policy, and particularly a 
social protection system, designed to countervail economic shocks, 
stabilizing income expectation and the pattern of consumption and 
saving.  
The saving rate dynamic of households’ disposable income 
(1995-2010) in Italy, Germany, France, Sweden and the UK (Euros-
tat data) gives a preliminary insight on the beneficial impact of an 
effective social protection design. We draw attention to the stability 
of the households’ saving rates in Germany and France, hovering 
around 15% of the disposable income from 1995 to 2010: the com-
parison with Italy is striking (figure 1). In 1995 the households’ sav-
ing rate in Italy was the highest (21,8%) while in 2010 became - after 
the UK - the lowest (12%), along a steady path of decline. In fact the 
level of the saving rate in Italy is even lower if we select the more 
appropriate comparison with the consumer households, whose saving 
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rate was 19,3% in 1995 and dropped to 8,9% in 2010 (in the follow-
ing we will refer only to the consumer households, unless otherwise 
specified). In the case of Sweden the households’ saving rate starts 
low and ends higher: it was 9,6% in 1995, slowed to 5,8% in 2000 
and since then it began an increasing path up to 12,9% in 2010, sur-
passing Italian saving rate. Households’ saving rate in the UK shows 
a pattern similar to the US: it declined from 9,4% in 1995 to the low-
est level of 1,7% in 2007, at the onset of the Great Recession: since 
then it rebounded to 6% in 2011. In section 5, we will show that 
households’ saving rates for most European countries are also related 
with the share of social protection benefits: Welfare State effective-
ness appears to be an overlooked explanation for this pattern. It is 
possible to show, for a sample of major European countries, that 
those with a better performing Welfare State are also good (France) 
or strong (Sweden and Germany) economic performers, both in 
terms of economic growth and public budget, coping better with the 
severe consequences of the Great Recession. Italy stands to the op-
posite with an inadequate design of its Welfare system and worse 
economic performances: the UK stands much closer to Italy than to 
Germany and France, being hardly hit by the Great Recession, with-
out a Welfare State as effective as in Germany, France and Sweden 
(Campiglio, 2013).  
In the next section we focus on Italy with the purpose to show 
how its declining saving rate is the country-specific  outcome of four 
deliberated major fiscal shocks, which squeezed households’ dispos-
able income (as a ratio to the GDP) and produced a huge income 
share redistribution between  institutional sectors: passed a critical 
threshold, a decrease of disposable income is no more  absorbed by 
precautionary saving and, missing countervailing transfers, shrinks 
consumption levels.  
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Figure 1 - Saving rate and financial wealth in Italy 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on Bank of Italy database 
 
Figure 2 - Households’ saving rate in five major European countries 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
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2. The households’ saving decline: a brief overview 
 
The household disposable income, as a share of GDP from 1991 to 
2011, recorded a slump of 7,5 point of GDP, which implies a striking 
transfer of resources between institutional sectors in the last 20 years: 
we find a close correlation between the disposable income of con-
sumer households, as a share of GDP, and the saving rate, as a share 
of disposable income, which falls 14,8 point, from a high of 23,7% in 
1991 to a low of 8,9% in 2011 (figure 3). The slump is closely re-
lated to four major economic events, prompted by economic misa-
lignments: a) the 1992 currency crisis, b) the run-up  to the Euro in 
1999, c) the 2006’s turning point followed by the sovereign debt cri-
sis since 2009 and the d) fiscal consolidation of 2012.  
These four events have in common the urgency of fiscal plans 
geared to pull through the two crisis or a hastened compliance with 
the Maastricht criteria: stiffer fiscal policies were the common thread 
through these four emergency events. Over two decades households 
income and consumption moved always in the same direction, while 
consumption and saving moved in opposite direction on 14 over 21 
years, which points to a consumption smoothing behavior by the 
households (figure 4).  
We find, indeed, a close relationship between the increase of the 
economy tax burden (direct + indirect taxes) and household’s saving 
rate over the last two decades (figure 5): the relationship is even 
stronger with indirect taxes, which are faster to be implemented in 
times of crisis but also more regressive. We note how each event had 
a different origin but brought about four distinct  downward steps of 
the savings rate, without no resilience. We therefore analyze in 
greater detail each one of the four events, starting from the 1992’s 
crisis, which – it has been noted - resembles the 2009’s crisis, being 
the former “endogenous” and the latter “exogenous”2: the 2009’s ex-
ogeneity becomes however again endogenous  in 2012. Our analysis 
                                                     
2 S. Rossi (2010) “Aspetti della politica economica italiana dalla crisi dalla crisi del   
1992-93 a quella del 2008-09”, marzo, Università Roma Tre, mimeo e S. Rossi 
(2009) “Controtempo. L’Italia nella crisi mondiale”, Laterza. 
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is aggregate and relies mainly on data by Istat, Bank of Italy, Euros-
tat and OECD. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Households’ income and saving 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database 
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Figure 4 - Households’ income and saving: rates of annual change 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database 
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Figure 5 - Households’ saving rate and tax burden  
(direct and indirect taxes) 
 
  
 
Source: our calculation on Bank of Italy (Statistiche di finanza pubblica nei paesi 
europei) and Istat database 
 
 
2.1. The 1992’s currency crisis 
 
In September 1992, the European Monetary System (EMS) was dis-
rupted by a severe currency crisis, which halted five years of ex-
change rate stability and interrupted the path under way to the Euro-
pean monetary union. While the causes of the break up are still mat-
ter of debate,3 mainly because of the “contagion” effect, there is 
some consensus on the case of Italy, whose crisis is closely related to 
misaligned “fundamentals”, namely a deterioration in competitive-
ness and balance of payment4.  The response to the 1992’s crisis was 
an emergency fiscal package, with a sharp increase of direct and in-
direct taxes, a collective agreement for a new wage indexation me-
chanism  and a public expenditures freeze. The lira’s devaluation, 
                                                     
3 Eichengreen (1993) gives a prompt analysis of the crisis. 
4 This is view is shared both by Eichengreen (1993) and De Grauwe (1996) p. 58. 
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following the exit from the EMS (until november 1996) prompted a 
spur in exports, while the price increase from imports was restrained 
by a wage agreement.  
The economic consequences of fiscal policy and devaluation can 
be measured by the change – between 1992 and 1995 – of the share 
of GDP for some selected aggregates of the income and demand 
sides of the GDP. The income side shows a drop of employees’ 
compensations of 3,5 points of GDP – mainly of gross wages and 
salaries (table 1) - while indirect taxes increased 1,2 points and cor-
porate saving soared 2,3 points (figure 6). The demand side shows a 
(corresponding) drop of domestic demand for consumption (-1,4 
points) and investments (-2 points), while exports share of GDP 
jumped 6,8 points (figure 7). GDP’s (declining) share of exports was 
16,6% in 1992 and abruptly increased to 23,4% in 1995, a level 
around which it hovered since, reaching its highest – 27% - in 2007.  
The fiscal policies, prompted by the currency crisis, caused three 
long-run structural changes: a) a drop in the share of employees’ 
gross wage and salaries, which continued until the year 2000, fol-
lowed by a slight increase thereafter, b) an upsurge of the tax burden, 
which also continued until the year 2000, and stabilized afterward, 
and c) a sharp increase of the export share level. Table 1 shows, in 
advance, the evolution of the main aggregates over the two decades, 
to argue that the recent economic quandaries are not that different 
from the early 1990’s. Now as then, indirect taxation has been the 
preferred instrument of economic policy because it is fast to get more 
tax revenues in period of emergency, while an increasingly open 
economy should have implied more social insurance against social 
risks, through Welfare State programs, but it did not (Rodrik, 1998; 
Campiglio 2011).  
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Figure 6 - Income distribution changes 1995-1992 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database 
 
Figure 7 - Spending – changes 1992-1995 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database 
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2.2. The Euro run-up and the Euro “dividend” 
 
In the years preceding the Euro’s inception, in 1999 and immediately 
after, a new emergency effort arose, in order to comply with the 
Maastricht criteria and joining the Euro currency from the beginning: 
demanding budget plans were approved, especially in 1996 and 
1997, to comply with the required convergence criteria. The adjust-
ment was achieved through a further tax increase (+2,9 points of 
GDP) and a decrease of employees’ compensation share (-2,1 point 
of GDP), split in –1,7 points of the social contributions and a -0,5 
points of gross wages and salaries (a reversal of the 1992-1995).  
The distinctive feature of this fiscal package was a further de-
crease of the consumer households’ disposable income following the 
successful decline of the interest rate spread, being interest payment 
a notable share of their income. It is crucial to note that in the period 
1996-1999 the gross saving slump (-29%) was more than balanced 
(figure 1) by a corresponding increase of the financial wealth 
(+44%): in the same period households divested Italy’s government 
bonds from 352,4 to 171,8 billions (-51%) and reduced bank deposits 
from 533,6 billions to 444,7 billions (-17%), while increasing stocks’ 
share in their portfolio, whose holding soared from 259,7 to 655,0 
billions (+152%), while rising their financial debt from 279,1 to 379 
billions (+36%).  
The outcome of the households portfolio reallocation, in the pe-
riod 1995-2000, was a 8 points decline of the saving rate on disposa-
ble income, while the financial wealth to disposable income ratio in-
creased from 2,5 in 1995 to a peak of 3,6 in 2000, a peak newly 
reached (3,7) only in 2007 (our computation taking as denominator 
consumer and producer households).  The crucial point is that, given 
the high wealth concentration, household saving rate decreases and 
financial wealth increases were unevenly distributed and the wealth 
divide of the higher 10% held steady: these data suggest that a simi-
lar aggregate rebalance by the wealthiest should be very unlikely af-
ter the Great Recession. 
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Table 2 - Households disposable income and interests payment 
(% GDP) 
 
Year Households 
disposable 
income/GDP 
of which: 
interest 
paid/GDP 
of which:  
interest 
paid/household 
disposable in-
come 
Saving/ 
Households 
disposable 
income 
1995        71,4       9,9            13,8      19,3 
2000        66,5       5,2           7,9      11,4 
2000-1995        - 4,9     - 4,7           - 5,9      - 7,9 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database 
 
 
The economic benefit of the interest rate decline on the public budget 
was huge, aptly named the “Euro dividend”: the income distribution 
effects were also considerable and  - to some extent – unintended5. 
Government was, not surprisingly, the main beneficiary with 4,6 
points of GDP, exactly balancing the income reduction by the house-
holds, while also firms took advantage and financial institutions lost 
(figure 8). 
As hinted above, the interest rate drop brought about a radical 
change of households’ portfolio allocation, away from government 
bonds: while the share of government bonds held by Italian residents 
fell swiftly in 1997-1998, the share held by foreign investors – pri-
vate and institutional - increased steadily, up to more than half the 
debt stock by 2005. The increasing exposure to the international cap-
ital markets carried along more volatility, as it happened during the 
sovereign debt crisis (figure 9), while the increasing share of interest 
payments going abroad rose correspondingly.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 The problem is currently debated in relation with the low interest rates prevailing 
in many countries (“Savers’ lament”, The Economist, December 1, 2012). 
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Figure 8 - Gainers and loser for  interest payments 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database 
 
 
The fiscal policy implemented carried on a further reduction of em-
ployee’s compensation, social contribution and wages/salaries:  since 
1992 employees’ compensation was pushed down 5,6 points of GDP 
- split in -2,4 points of employers’ social contribution and -3,3 points 
of lower wage and salaries - while indirect taxes increased a further 
2,9 points of GDP, for a total of 4,1 point of GDP (tab 1). House-
holds’ saving declined four years in a row, between 1996 and 2000, 
reflecting a consumption smoothing: saving rebounded in 2001-
2002, and so the saving rate, but on a lower level, remaining stable 
through 2000-2005 and started again to decline in 2006, down to a 
low of 8,9% – on disposable income – in 2011. 
The constraint of the public budget balance eased, allowing an in-
crease of government consumption expenditures, general and indivi-
dualized: both increased, reaching a peak in 2001 which was howev-
er symmetric to the through of the real per capita decrease in 1994. 
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Between 1992 and 2002 the real per capita consumption expendi-
tures increased only slightly and so also the real households’ income 
adjusted for the public expenditures.  
The question is whether fiscal policy, having achieved the goal of 
the EMU, gave back to the households what government levied with 
taxes and less expenditures during the previous decade. The answer 
is that from 2000 to 2005 direct and indirect tax burden (at national 
level) declined slightly and gradually, while government expenditure 
did not compensate for the ground lost (figure 11). Looking more 
closely to government expenditures we need to distinguish two main 
components: a) monetary transfers (like pensions, unemployment 
benefits, family allowances), and b) in-kind expenditures for health 
care provisions (hospitals, physicians, drugs) and education. For 
these categories we consider the per capita expenditures, adjusted for 
consumer inflation (monetary transfers) or GDP deflator (health and 
education), since 1991. Health and education expenditure – real per 
capita – jointly decrease until the end of the 1990’s: afterwards they 
diverge and while per capita education expenditure continues to de-
crease (- 17% between 1991 and 2011), per capita health expendi-
tures started to increase, recovering more than the previous decrease 
(+ 20% between 1991 and 2011). The monetary transfers show in-
stead a steadily increase over the entire period (+ 15% over the same 
period).  
The drastic demographic change which has been unfolding in Ita-
ly over the last two decades is the driving force which can explain 
these different patterns, and much of what happened in the two last 
decades. The Italian population aged 60 years or more increased a 
staggering +36%, from 1991 to 2011, while the per capita health ex-
penditure – whose demand grows steeply after 60 - increased less, 
+20%: the monetary transfers, for which pensions are the bigger 
share,  increased instead a little more, +42%. The real per capita ex-
penditure for education decreased -17%, which is partly accounted 
by a declining number of younger population: however there are at 
least two reasons which call for an increasing demand for education 
expenditure. The first is the growing share of young immigrants, of 
school age, which require an additional commitment to further their 
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citizenship, and the second is the poor outcome of the Italian school 
system, well below the OECD average for the PISA rankings (figure 
12).  
 
 
Figure 9 - Government bonds holding:  
National residents and abroad 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on the Bank of Italy database 
 
 
  
 
24
Figure 10 - Households and Government:  
Income distribution changes 2000-1995 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database 
 
 
 
  
 
25
Figure 11 - Government collective and individual real  
per capita consumption 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database 
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Figure 12 - Health, education and social transfers expenditures 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database. General government accounts 1990-
2001, table 30 
 
 
2.3. The 2006’s turning point 
 
In 2007 the gross general government debt to GDP ratio in Italy 
reached its lowest level since the early 1990’s - down to 103,3 – as a 
result of a new round of a tighter fiscal policy implemented to hasten 
public debt reduction. The sudden eruption of the Great Crisis stuck 
the country at the crossroad of the policy implementation, and as a 
consequence the public debt to GDP ratio soared to 120,7 in 2011, 
while the GDP plunged in 2009: sharp increases of unemployment 
and public debt have been sweeping South European countries ever 
since. The sudden economic shock unveiled the inadequacy of the 
social protection system in Italy - namely its lack of effectiveness in 
coping with increasing households’ economic strains and inadequate 
counter-cyclical behavior, given its low per capita benefits – and the 
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further decrease of real disposable income, as a consequence of the 
tax burden increase and the higher inflation.  
Real disposable income per capita in 2011 went back to the level 
of 1991: the abrupt increase of immigrants – most of them individu-
als – and the time lag for legalizing the unauthorized has probably 
biased the annual measure, but the real per capita value is neverthe-
less correct over the two decades. The retracing of households’ dis-
posable income is even more disturbing, because of a long standing 
downward trend which the economic crisis has only hastened. After 
the 2000’s through in saving (and the consumption peak), house-
holds’ saving rate bounced back slowly until 2005, followed by a 
further turning point in 2006, when the saving rate on disposable in-
come dipped again, and then went all the way down to the lowest 
level in the last two decades, less than 9% in 2011 (figure 13). The 
saving decline, related to the real income drop, was caused jointly by 
a higher tax burden and the consequences of the economic crisis 
(figure 14): the saving decline is also related to the increase of 
households’ loans, due to mortgages or consumer credit (figure 15). 
The loans’ increase is not, by itself, a signal of economic stress, be-
cause loans – granted by financial institutions - are usually related to 
the wealth and income level: if however we combine the relationship 
with the dynamic of specific income strains, based on EU-Silc sur-
vey, the signal of stress is strongly supported. The EU-Silc survey 
asks two questions which are closely related with households’ sav-
ing: the first is whether the household can afford “to face unexpected 
financial expenses”, where the threshold of unexpected expenses is 
set to 800 euro, while the second asks whether the household has “ar-
rears” (mortgage or rent, utility bills or hire purchase). The European 
comparison of households’ economic strains related to savings shows 
in Italy a sudden jump in 2011, which is noteworthy if compared 
with the stable or improving situations in Germany, France, Sweden 
and the UK (table 3). 
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Table 3 
 
Inability to face unexpected financial expenses 
% population 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Germany  41,0 36,5 34,9 34,6 33,7 34,5
France 33,3 34,5 34,1 32,5 33,0 33,0
Italy 27,5 32,0 31,6 33,1 33,3 38,6
Sweden 13,9 18,0 19,5 18,5 15,8 16,6
United Kingdom 28,5 26,6 28,6 31,1 34,7 36,7
Arrears (mortgage or rent, utility bills or hire purchase)
% population 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Germany  6,9 5,8 5,6 5,6 4,9 5,2
France 9,7 9,8 9,6 11,2 10,8 9,9
Italy 12,9 12,5 15,8 12,7 12,8 14,2
Sweden 8,0 5,8 6,2 7,0 6,4 5,9
United Kingdom 8,7 8,5 7,4 .. 9,6 8,9
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database 
 
 
The comparison of the households’ saving rates in Italy, Germany, 
France, Sweden and the UK show that Italy’s saving rate was the 
highest in 1995, converges to the levels of Germany and France in 
2005 and then departs downwards since 2006, becoming much lower 
with the economic crisis, while Sweden instead increased (figure 1). 
The question arises about what makes the difference between Italy, 
on one side, Germany, France, Sweden and the UK on the other: our 
answer is that Germany, France and Sweden benefited from a well 
designed countercyclical Welfare State which stabilized households’ 
income, monetary and in-kind, avoiding the shocks which instead 
destabilized Italian economy (Campiglio, 2013). 
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Figure 13 - Real disposable income per household and per capita 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database 
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Figure 14 - Tax burden (domestic direct and indirect /GDP) 
 
 
 
Source: our computation on Bank of Italy and Istat database 
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Figure 15 - Households’ saving rate and loans  
(to disposable income) 
 
 
 
Source: our computation on Bank of Italy and Istat database 
 
 
2.4. The 2011’s European fiscal consolidation 
 
In 2011 tighter budget rules aimed at fiscal consolidation have been 
approved by the European Union, calling for a reduction of deficit 
and the public debt and closer mechanism of surveillance. The main 
provisions are the following: 
 
a) the six-pack, effective since December 2011, made of five 
regulations and one directive, which strengthen the Stability 
and Growth Pact in the fiscal field, and  the Treaty on Stabil-
ity, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), signed in March 
2012, which includes the Fiscal Compact. The two provi-
sions overlap but have also distinct features, in particular the 
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reverse qualified majority voting procedure. A two pack 
provision is added for the Euro countries.  
b) More specifically the provisions regarding the economic pol-
icy in Italy are: 
- the commitment to reduce the public debt/GDP ratio “at 
an average rate of one twentieth per year as a bench-
mark” when the ratio “exceeds the 60% reference value” 
(article 4, TSCG). 
- the commitment to a budget balance, “deemed to be res-
pected if the annual structural balance of the general 
government is at its country-specific medium term ob-
jective [(MTO)] … with a lower limit of a structural def-
icit of 0,5% of the gross domestic product at market 
prices” (article 3, TSGS). With the Parliamentary Ap-
proval on April 2012, Italian Constitution was modified 
accordingly 
- “annual structural balance of the general government” 
refers to the “annual cyclically-adjusted net of one-off 
and temporary measures” and an exceptional circums-
tance refers to “unusual event outside control …or to pe-
riod of severe economic downturn … provided that the 
temporary deviation … does not endanger fiscal sustai-
nability in the medium term” (article 3, TSCG) 
 
In November 2011 an emergency act, going by the name “Saving Ita-
ly”, was enacted, with the target – jointly with the previous acts – to 
achieve a budget “close to balance” in 2013, one year earlier than 
what originally planned. The tax burden was planned to increase 2,6 
points of GDP, from 42,5% in 2011 to 45,1% in 2012, and to an all 
time high of 45,4% in 2013.6 The decline of the saving rate on 
households’ disposable income, while still falling down, seems to 
bottom out, which would imply  a higher “propensity to consume” – 
as an accounting identity - while in fact masks a private consumption 
                                                     
6 “Documento di Economia e Finanza 2012”, Programma di Stabilità e Analisi e 
Tendenze della Finanza Pubblica, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, p. 12 e 
seg. 
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slump: it could signal a restructuring of consumption patterns to 
make room for a process of gradual deleveraging. In Italy the in-
crease of households’ indebtedness is still lower than in Germany 
and France, but converging to the similar increasing level in France 
and the decreasing ratio in Germany: Italian households are trying to 
deleverage and consolidate their financial position, facing however 
the constraint of falling disposable income7 (figure 15 and  16).  
Selling assets, real or financial, could be a temporary buffer, giv-
en the high wealth/disposable income ratio of Italian households: 
there are however two caveats. The first is the high wealth inequali-
ty8: in 2010 the top 10% of households held 45,9% of total wealth, 
with a still higher concentration for financial wealth, while the low-
est 50% of households held 9,4% of total wealth. The second is that 
houses – the main item of real wealth – accounted for 58% of total 
net wealth: however their liquidity is much lower, especially when 
the owner lives in the house, or during a serious recession. Moreover, 
most of the net wealth increase between 1995 and 2011 is related to 
saving (65%), which bring back to the issue of households’ saving as 
an engine of well-being and growth. As a consequence a low level of 
saving becomes an economic and social problem when income and 
wealth inequality runs higher, which bring to the forefront the issue 
of negative savings, i,e. households whose income is lower than their 
consumption. 
 
 
                                                     
7  Household debt overhang can hold back consumption both as a consequence of 
debt service (Dynan, 2012) and worsening expectations of future in-
come.  
8 The following data comes from Banca d’Italia (2012) “La ricchezza delle famiglie 
italiane”. 
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Figure 16 - Households’ debts 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database 
 
 
3. Households’ negative saving 
 
As Katona pointed out (1949) during 1946 and 1947 “willingness to 
spend more than one’s income was provided by the relatively high 
income level and the optimistic expectations of most families”, 
which caused an unexpected shift of consumption-income relation-
ship:  a forecasting failure which prompted new theories and re-
searches on consumer behavior. Negative saving is now interpreted 
as a rational process of borrowing, when young, and dissaving, when 
retired, in order to smooth consumption: however it is now well rec-
ognized that capital markets are incomplete,  but nevertheless nega-
tive saving is still on overlooked issue. Negative saving can be, of 
course, also a signal of economic stress or a gloomy mood, but it can 
mean much more. For our purposes we use a stringent definition of 
negative saving, excluding imputed rents from the disposable income 
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and durable goods from the consumption: negative saving is there-
fore the difference between monetary income and current expendi-
tures, the former being less than the latter. How the gap is filled and 
how long the disequilibrium will persist is an open question for 
which more research is needed9. The following analysis, based on the 
Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) 
over the period 1993-2010, show some clear and interesting patterns, 
which we propose as frequencies conditioned by the type of charac-
teristic considered, i.e. as a proxy of conditional probability, for ex-
ample Probability (negative income| household with 1 earner).  
In fact the saving rate for the households with 2 earners is consis-
tently higher than the earning for the households with 1 earner: the 
average for the economy – hovering on the high level of 15% - turn 
out to be the simple average of the two types, with clear conse-
quences on income inequality (figure 17). The higher saving rate for 
the households with 2 earners can be explained at least in two ways: 
first of all the quasi-fixed costs for a couple without children are sim-
ilar for households with 1 and 2 earners, but the couple with 2 earn-
ers will get a an almost double disposable income, with the opportu-
nity of spending and saving more. The question arises of why there 
are couples with only 1 earner: we suggest two main reasons.  A 
couple can have only 1 earner because there are children and for one 
member, typically the mother, it is too difficult to reconcile work and 
family life and/or the labor market does not offer enough job open-
ings, as it happens in the South of Italy and during the Great Reces-
sion.  
Looking to the professional status we find three distinct patterns: 
households with blue-collar(s) as main earner(s) recorded an increas-
ing negative saving since 2000, which would seem to imply a wor-
sening of their standard of life. To a less degree the same pattern ap-
plies to the white collars, whose negative savings also increase since 
2000. Retired people are instead the main social group whose nega-
tive saving has been declining since the early 1990’s, converging 
with the white collars: there at least two possible reasons. This social 
group can rely more on higher past saving and given their limited 
                                                     
9  See Dynan (2012). 
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borrowing access they tend to decrease their negative saving and/or 
the consumption per capita or per household is, ceteris paribus, lower 
for older couples or individuals, for age-related reasons (figure 18).  
Negative savings are also higher in the South, and lower in the Cen-
tre, while increasing steadily in the North since 200010: the increase 
in the North can be explained by the higher burden of the economic 
crisis, the higher cost of living in the North and the shift to market of 
caring activities for children and the elder people (figure 19). These 
patterns are consistent with two other groups: the probability of 
negative saving increase for the households living in rented houses 
and also increasing for the households whose reference person is less 
than 40 years old (figure 20).  
 
 
Figure 17 - Negative saving: by number of earners 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Bank of Italy SHIW 
                                                     
10 These results are broadly in accordance with Jappelli and Padula (2007), who run 
an econometric estimate over the period 1984-2004. 
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Figure 18 - Negative saving: professional status 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Bank of Italy SHIW 
 
Figure 19 - Negative saving: North, Centre and South 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Bank of Italy SHIW 
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Figure 20 - Negative saving: age and rent 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Bank of Italy SHIW 
 
 
4. The big saving shift and the Great Recession 
 
Households are a major contributor to the pool of Gross Domestic 
Saving: in 2011 consumer households contributed 36,1% to the total 
domestic saving, with an impressive slump with respect to the 62,2% 
in 1995. If we look at the nominal values of the gross saving the two 
main economic actors on the economic landscape were the non fi-
nancial corporations and the consumer households: the former in-
creased the value of saving while the latter acted as a shock absorber 
of all the main fiscal packages, especially those related to the run-up 
to the Euro and the sovereign debt crisis (figure 21). The perspective 
changes considerably if we look at the saving as a share of GDP: be-
tween 2011 and 1995 the share of consumer households saving de-
creased sharply (7,9 points of GDP), while the corporate saving share 
remained rather stable over the two decades. Government saving, i.e. 
the balance of current revenues less current expenditures, was nega-
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tive from 1995 to 1997 and from 2003 to 2005, positive from 1998 to 
2002 and from 2006 to 2008: the Great Recession pushed again gov-
ernment saving in the negative zone from 2009 to 2011 (figure 22). 
The government negative saving was the consequence of the reces-
sion rather than increasing government spending: from 2008 to 2011 
the current public expenditures increased nominally +5% and +1% 
real, given a +4% price increase, while the GDP nominal growth was 
+2,9%, i.e. lower than public expenditures and negative in real terms.  
We have already shown that for a sample of major European 
countries, countervailing social protection expenditures have been an 
effective counterbalance to the problems of unemployment and 
households hardship, putting temporarily on hold the goal of gov-
ernment balance, or balancing the budget with one-off (temporary) 
expenditure cuts, allowed by a high level of social protection ex-
penditure (Campiglio, 2013). Furthermore, if we consider that the 
countervailing role played (in the past) by the family is now wea-
kened, the role of the Welfare State should strengthened accordingly, 
directly and through the family.  
The big saving shift, siphoned by the households income, was not 
neutral: in fact  the saving rate for the economy declined from 22,2% 
of the GDP in 1995 to 16,4% in 2011, reducing the flow of funds 
from households saving to finance government deficit and corporate 
investments (figure 22 and 23). The issue is crucial for financing 
domestic investment: if the gross domestic saving is less than the 
gross domestic investments the gap can be filled by the inflow of 
borrowed foreign saving and, symmetrically, a capital outflow is the 
outcome of saving exceeding investments. In an open economy posi-
tive domestic net saving is the source of funding for investments 
abroad, while negative net saving need to be funded by foreign sav-
ers: at the same time net lending or borrowing of an open country is 
the counterpart of the current account balance. Until 2001, Italian 
economy was a net lender, while afterwards it slowly became a net 
borrower, more than 3% of GDP in 2010 and 2011 (figure 24): the 
current account deficit call for an explanation which goes far beyond 
the economic crisis, retracing the roots of unsolved economic misa-
lignments of the Italian economy in the last two decades.  
  
 
40
Figure 21 - Saving by institutional sectors 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database 
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Figure 22 - Saving by institutional sectors:  
changes 2011-1995 (%GDP) 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database 
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Figure 23 - Saving by institutional sector 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database 
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Figure 24 - Saving and current account 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat and OECD database  
 
 
5. Saving rate and demography  
 
Italy is one of the oldest major countries in the world, together with 
Germany and Japan, and therefore it seems appropriate to ask wheth-
er the demographic shift, with an increasing share of older and re-
tired population, is a primary long-run cause for the saving rate de-
cline.  In the Euro area (17) the share of population aged 65 and over 
has increased since 1995, while the household saving rate remained 
rather stable, however with different and divergent patterns across 
countries. Over the period 1995-2011 there is a clear negative corre-
lation between households’ saving rate and the share of persons aged 
over 65 in the case of Italy, Belgium, Netherland and Poland, a posi-
tive correlation for Germany and Sweden, and no clear relationship 
in the case of France and Norway. Figure 25 shows clearly the di-
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verging ageing pattern between Italy and Germany in contrast with 
the younger population in France: however the common ageing pat-
tern between Italy and Germany is not associated with the same pat-
tern in the saving rate, which is constant in Germany while dropping 
in Italy (figure 2). To shed light on the cause of the divergence we 
note how aging population in Italy pulled immigration of caregivers 
to a much greater extent than in Germany: the number of caregivers 
in Italy has rapidly increased, close to one million, mainly women 
who emigrate from their country to support their family and children.  
Because estimates of “out of pocket” money for health care by the 
households are between 28 to 30 billions11, creeping privatization of 
health care is a major drain of parents’ and grandparents’ monetary 
resources.  
To check whether this is a plausible explanation of demographic 
impact on the saving rate, we test for a relationship between the so-
cial protection benefits, as a share of the GDP, and the saving rate: 
the hypothesis being that a well designed Welfare State could pro-
vide for the needs of people with inadequate income, through cash 
transfers (like family allowance) and in-kind provisions (like health 
care). The test for a subset of European countries for which we can 
find comparable data seems to support this hypothesis (Figure 26), 
suggesting indeed a further stronger relationship between social ben-
efits and potential output, which we proxy with the share of popula-
tion of working age. Indeed, a cross-section for the European coun-
tries shows a clear relationship between the share of population 15-
64, a measure of potential workforce, and social protection benefits 
(associated with the level of household saving rate), while in turn the 
social protection benefits (share of GDP) is a clear explanatory vari-
able of the tax revenues-to-GDP ratio (including social contributions) 
(figure 27-28). The relationship between social protection expendi-
tures and potential workforce, as estimated for the European coun-
tries, allows for some counterfactual exercises. An hypothetical US 
Welfare State, based on the European relationship with the work-
force potential, is estimated 26% of the GDP in the US: in 2011 out-
lays for health, Medicare, income security and social security already 
                                                     
11 I thank  Pietro Cerrito for providing me these estimates. 
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accounted for 14,5% of the GDP. The US Census projection to 2050 
for the population 14-64 years is 62,3%, down from 67,2% in 2015. 
The same exercise in the case of China implies a hypothetical Wel-
fare State worth 15,9% of the GDP in 2011: the projection of the re-
lationship to 2020, 2030, 2040, 2050 returns an increasing share of 
GDP of 21,4%, 25,2%, 34,6% and 38,2% (population 15-64 years: 
71,8% in 2015 and 60,2% in 2050)12. The workforce potential is, not 
surprisingly, closely monitored because it is a clear force behind the 
striking increase of the saving rate in China, from 36.3% of the GDP 
in 1982 to 52,7% in 2011 (World Bank), simultaneously to the in-
crease of the potential workforce (15-64 years) from 61,1% in 1982 
to 72,5% in 2011. The forecast show a potential advantage for the 
US, in the next decades, while the one-child policy in China, man-
dated nationwide in 1979, could potentially produce a huge boom 
and bust in the next 20 to 30 years. 
 
 
                                                     
12 Demographic projections for China are from Wei and Jinju (2009).  
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Figure 25 - Population 65 + 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database 
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Figure 26 - Households’ saving and social benefits 
 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
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Figure 27 - Welfare State and potential active population 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
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Figure 28 - Social protection benefit, tax and social contributions 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database 
 
 
6. Saving rate and quasi-fixed costs.  
 
The real per capita household disposable income in 2011 is almost 
the same than twenty years earlier, in 1991: the question is whether, 
beyond the previous arguments, other economic forces are driving 
the saving rate lower in the long-run. The disposable income per 
household, deflated with the price index, is slowly decreasing since 
the early 1990’s and therefore also other forces are slowly changing 
the economy (figure 13).  
The decreasing family size in Italy, as well in many other coun-
tries, is the closer candidate calling for a closer scrutiny. For exam-
ple, it is customary to adjust, with the equivalence scales, for the 
scale effect of  increasing family’s size, but it should be acknowl-
edged also the downside, i.e. the decreasing scale effect of a smaller 
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family size. The Italian average family size was 2,85 in 1991 and de-
creased to 2,4 in 2011 (estimate), i.e. – 15,7% in 20 years: even more 
telling is the increasing share of one-person households, which ac-
counted for 9,5% of total households in 1951 and increased up to 
24,9% in 2001, while households with 6 persons and more dropped 
from 20,1% in 1951 to 1,7% in 2001  (figure 29). The diseconomies 
of scale should show up as especially relevant for the quasi-fixed ex-
penditures, i.e. costs that each household would incur simply because 
it is an economic unit, meaning that the average household needs 
more income to get the same welfare level, which in turn should 
imply an increasing share of quasi-fixed costs and possibly a lower 
saving rate. Another way to deal with this issue is to figure out the 
effect of a consumption function shifting upward because of a higher 
subsistence level, which in the competitive market would correspond 
to a higher positive value for the initial endowment of each agent. 
The absolute level of subsistence is time-varying over a long time 
span: goods and services which were considered luxury fifty years 
ago are now considered part of a normal and decent life, the mini-
mum level of income necessary to be a citizen of a national commu-
nity. Quasi-fixed costs for a family should represent an increasing 
share of total consumption (and income), simply because it becomes 
more expensive to make a decent living in a civilized society.  
A (short-run) confirmation for this hypothesis can be obtained 
considering households’ total consumption (excluding imputed rents) 
ranked by deciles and the structure of consumption for each decile: 
for each decile we consider food consumption (at home and away 
from home) plus housing expenditures as a measure of quasi-fixed 
costs. A more complete measure would account for  consumer du-
rables and transport cost required for commuting. Figure 30 summar-
ize the share of quasi-fixed costs (food plus housing) for the 1st, 5th 
and 10th decile, and the average, for each year from 1997 to 2010: it 
is possible to check that the share of quasi-fixed costs decreases 
sharply with the increase of households’ consumption level while 
during the period considered increased slightly but steadily. In par-
ticular the share of quasi-fixed costs (as here defined) for the 5th de-
cile equals 53,9% in 2010, up from 49,7% in 1997, while, at the 
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same time, the average family size increases monotonically with the 
increasing consumption level of each decile.  
 
 
Figure 29 - Households per number of persons 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database 
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Figure 30 - Households’ quasi-fixed costs 
 
 
 
Source: our calculation on Istat database 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The sharp decline of total and consumer saving in Italy can be ex-
plained by the sequence of four severe fiscal packages implemented 
to face emergency crisis: policy instruments chosen made the eco-
nomic burden of the adjustment falling entirely on consumer house-
holds, whose real income fell sharply together with their saving rate. 
The falling real income of consumer households is therefore the ma-
jor cause of the saving rate drop while the lack of economic equity is 
the main and recurring policy shortcoming from which it originated. 
Very low households’ saving rates propagated their impact to the en-
tire economy: less funding for domestic investments and public debt, 
increasing foreign debt and current account deficit, increasing private 
debt and economic strain, tighter negative saving for one earner’s 
families and blue-collars, are the main consequences for which we 
  
 
53
could provide evidences. The changing age structure, caused by a 
fertility drop, had widespread consequences in Italy as well as in oth-
er European countries: the rapidly ageing economy has a detectable 
effect on saving rate while the role of the Welfare State increases 
with the decreasing share of the working age population, in turn a 
proxy of output potential. We make a counterfactual exercise for the 
U.S. and China and the results are a glimmer view of a global future 
scenario. Shrinking family’s size and the increasing share of quasi-
fixed costs for a decent life are also a structural cause for declining 
saving rate. We suggest that a well designed Welfare State can 
smooth and balance the adjustment processes of a society, promoting 
innovations through equity, while allowing the transition to a sus-
tainable development.  
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